Students Alice and Bob take an examination in their quantum mechanics class, and thereby illustrate some aspects of energy decoherence.
Quantum mechanics is a beautiful theory. It is also, in the hands of skilled practitioners, a wildly-successful theory for microscopic phenomena, in spite of the contradiction between the world as we experience it and the superpositions of macroscopically-distinguishable states which (at least naively) would seem to be implied by unitarity of evolution in time.
The "time" in which quantum states are supposed to evolve unitarily is a parameter, not a dynamical variable of the theory. On the other hand, any actual determination of time would involve the reading of a real clock, which is a physical (and hence a quantum) system. It has been suggested (for example, in refs. [1] - [5] ) that one should study the evolution of a quantum system not with respect to an abstract time parameter, but rather with respect to the reading of a clock considered as a physical system. I will refer to this reading as the "relative time". As I will review below, the evolution of a quantum system with respect to a real (and hence not infinitely-accurate) clock will involve decoherence in energy of that system, and it has also been suggested (for example, in refs. [5] - [7] ) that decoherence in energy could at least alleviate the alleged conflict between quantum predictions for microscopic phenomena and the appearance of the macroscopic world.
A seemingly-different approach (which does not involve the explicit consideration of clocks as physical systems) is to assume that in fact the evolution of quantum states is not unitary, but rather that unitary evolution is supplemented by collapse onto states of definite total energy [7] - [9] . I will refer to these theories as "energy-driven collapse theories," and will review below the fact that in these theories quantum states experience energy decoherence just as they do in relative-time calculations.
It would certainly be interesting if it could be shown that either relativetime calculations or energy-driven collapse theories made predictions for microscopic phenomena which could be experimentally distinguished from the predictions of standard quantum theory. This possibility suggests several questions. For example, if one performs an experiment using a real (hence not infinitely-accurate) clock and hopes to observe evidence of energy decoherence, one might ask whether the existence of a more-nearly-accurate clock somewhere else in the universe could affect the decoherence one was hoping to detect. Not surprisingly, the answer to this question is "no" (and I do not mean to imply that any of the referenced authors have ever suggested otherwise), but in contemplating similar questions it might be helpful to consider a simple story [10] in which standard non-relativistic quantum theory is supposed to hold exactly, and in which it is assumed that there is an arbitrarily-accurate clock, but which will nevertheless lead to energy decoherence of the type mentioned above.
Let us then imagine that two students whose names are Alice and Bob are taking an examination for their class in quantum mechanics. They are told that there is an isolated quantum system Q whose time-independent Hamiltonian is H Q , and which at time t = 0 is in the state ρ Q (0). They are asked what is the state of that system "now" (i. e., at the time the question is asked).
There is a clock on the wall of the examination room, which for the purpose of this story I take to be infinitely accurate and capable of being read with infinite precision. Alice looks at this clock, and sees that it reads a time I denote as t A ; she setsh = 1, and writes as her answer
Bob does not look at the clock on the wall; instead, he looks at his inexpensive wristwatch, which reads a time I denote as t B . Since he knows that his wristwatch is not accurate, he does not assume that the actual time (i.e., the time shown on the wall clock) is equal to t B ; from his experience with the watch, he assigns a probability density I denote as P (t|t B ) for the actual time to be t given that his watch reads t B . He has learned in class that, if the time were surely t, the state of the system Q would be
since he thinks that the time is t with probability P (t|t B ), his answer to the examination question is [11]
From equations 1 and 3, we can see that
It has been pointed out by Poulin [12] that this equation arises from relative-time calculations. Also, a special case of this equation arises in energy-driven collapse theories. To see that, take P (t|t B ) to be a Gaussian in (t B − t) with width proportional to √ t B , that is, take
then eq. 4 can be re-written, with the variable η = (t B − t)/ √ λt B , as
This is the same expression for the quantum state as Pearle [13] has shown to arise in collapse theories. Thus properties of ρ Q,B will also be valid in either relative-time or energy-driven collapse theories. This is true even though in the story of the quantum-mechanics exam I had stipulated that quantum states evolve unitarily (with no modification for collapse) and that there does exist an arbitrarily-accurate clock; Bob just does not happen to have looked at it.
Here are some properties of the states assigned by Alice and Bob:
• If P (t|t B ) were given by δ(t − t B ) (that is, if Bob's watch were in fact completely accurate) then it would follow from eq. 4 that • Under unitary time evolution a pure state remains pure. If ρ Q (0) is a pure state, then ρ Q,A will be pure also, but ρ Q,B need not be pure.
In fact, in the case in which ρ Q,A is pure, eq. 4 gives an ensemble decomposition for ρ Q,B . According to Bob, the initially-pure state ρ Q (0) has evolved into the mixed state ρ Q,B .
• Consider matrix elements of ρ in a basis of energy eigenstates. From eq. 1,
If 
is not independent of t A ); I will call this "complete" energy decoherence.
Now suppose that N represents an observable of the quantum system Q, and that Alice and Bob are each asked to calculate the expected value of N . Alice will calculate N A = T r[Nρ Q,A ], and Bob will calculate N B = T r[N ρ Q,B ]. In the case of complete energy decoherence, N B will be independent of t B , although N A need not be independent of t A .
• Suppose that system Q is composed of two subsystems S and C which are dynamically independent, i.e. that H Q = H S + H C ; suppose also that these two subsystems are initially uncorrelated, i.e. that ρ Q (0) = ρ S (0) ⊗ ρ C (0). Then ρ Q,A (t A ) will also be a product:
will in general not be a product [14] . If Bob were asked to write the state of S he could either, in analogy to eq. 3, write
or he could calculate
with ρ Q,B (t B ) given by eq. 3; he would get the same answer either way. Similarly, Bob could calculate
would not in general be equal to the tensor product of ρ S,B and ρ C,B .
• Now suppose that N is an observable of the subsystem S, and that subsystem C is itself a clock (which will be assumed to agree arbitrarily well with the clock on the wall). Let T be an observable of C, with orthonormal eigenvectors {|t }, and take [15] 
Alice and Bob are each asked the following question: "If N and T were now measured and the value of T were found to be t, what would you expect for the value of N ?"
Alice knows that the value t agrees with t A , so she could simply write
Alternatively, she could calculate (letting [ N |t] denote the expectation value of N given that t had been found)
where ρ Q,A (t A ) = ρ S,A (t A ) ⊗ |t A t A |, and P t projects C onto |t ; of course she would get the same answer either way.
Bob can calculate
where
and since T r[ρ S,A ⊗ |t t|] = 1 and T r[N ρ S,A ⊗ |t t|] = T r[Nρ S,A ], Bob will find that • Let's again think of Q as a single system, and let N be an observable of Q. Say Bob is asked the following question: "If you were to look at the clock on the wall and see a time t, what would you expect to find for the value of N ?" He could of course just do what Alice does; he knows that if the clock on the wall reads t then the state of Q is as given in eq. 2, and that N = T r[Nρ Q ]. However, suppose for some reason he in enamored of the procedure described previously, which is to consult his watch rather than the wall clock to write a quantum state, and then to find the expectation of N from that quantum state. He could consider the compound system consisting of Q together with the wall clock, in which case the wall clock would be an internal clock of that compound system, so he could proceed as above: write the state of the compound system as in eq. 3, and then find the expectation of N given that the wall clock reads t, as in eq. 13 (with the compound system replacing Q in those equations). Of course he would get the same answer either way, just as his result (eq. 15) agrees with Alice's result (eq. 11).
The moral of this story is that although ρ Q,B (t B ) exhibits energy decoherence (and in the extreme case of complete energy decoherence is independent of t B ), nevertheless if Q contains a subsystem which is an accurate clock (or, which amounts to the same thing, if Q can be expanded so as to include such a subsystem) then Bob can recover the time dependence of a quantum system as seen by Alice by considering the correlation between that system and the internal clock. This story might help us to interpret energy-driven collapse theories. Those theories postulate that unitary evolution of quantum states is supplemented by collapse onto states of definite total energy [16] . As shown in eq. 5.6a of Pearle [13] , in these theories the state of a quantum system Q at time t is given by
where (ρ Q ) U represents what the state would be if it did evolve unitarily, that is
The theory of ref. [6] , also, leads to an expression for ρ Q which is essentially identical to that in eq. 16. The relevance of the story of the quantum-mechanics exam is, of course, that the expression for ρ Q,B given in eq. 6 is the same as that for ρ Q given in eq. 16. So now we can ask what an energy-driven collapse theory would imply for the time-dependence of the expectation value of some observable N of some quantum system S. One way to answer this question would be to apply eq. 16 to the compound system Q consisting of S together with a clock. The clock would then be an internal clock; just as Bob, in spite of the energy decoherence of ρ Q,B can reproduce the time-dependence as seen by Alice by considering the correlation between S and the clock, so too would the time dependence of N (with respect to that clock) as predicted by an energy-driven collapse theory be exactly the same as that predicted by standard quantum theory, i.e. without energy-driven collapse. This result has been shown in some detail by Simon and Jaksch [17] ; see also ref. [18] for a similar result for the theory of ref. [6] .
On the other hand, Pearle [13] has suggested a second way in which one might calculate the time dependence of N in an energy-driven collapse theory: take Q in eq. 16 to be just S by itself, and say as usual that N = T r[N ρ Q (t)]. But then, as pointed out by Pearle, there seems to be a paradox: although according to the first method of calculation N agrees with standard quantum theory, according to the second it does not; for example, in the case of complete energy decoherence, the second method would imply that N was constant even if the first implied it was not constant.
Since any clock could be considered to be a quantum system, it is difficult to see how the first method of calculation, which applies the evolution predicted by an energy-driven collapse theory (eq.16) to the combined system of S and the clock, could be incorrect within that theory. Because within such a theory the value of t is not directly accessible (since clocks as well as anything else are supposed to suffer energy-driven collapse), one might perhaps deny the validity of the second method of calculation. One would thereby avoid Pearle's paradox, but at the cost of allowing that the theory is observationally completely equivalent to standard quantum theory. It seems then that these theories, if interpreted to be non-paradoxical, not only do not lead to testable predictions for microscopic phenomena which differ from those of standard quantum theory but also do not help to reconcile quantum theory with the observed macroscopic world.
Whether or not there is energy-driven collapse, as long as one has a sufficiently-accurate clock one should expect that results of experiments on microscopic systems would agree with predictions of standard quantum theory. But since, as stressed in refs [1] - [5] , real clocks are not infinitely accurate, this agreement would not be exact. This is illustrated in the story of the quantum-mechanics exam by the fact that ρ Q,B does not coincide with ρ Q,A ; if Bob does not use an accurate clock his expectation for measurements on Q will not be the same as Alice's. Note that the mere existence of an accurate clock does not affect Bob's analysis. Bob could have written eq. 3 even if there were in fact no clock on the wall; the clock on the wall makes no difference to Bob if he does not look at it.
More generally, any experiment will involve apparatus-clocks, lasers, whatever-which necessarily have some inaccuracy. And whether this inaccuracy comes from limits set by quantum gravity (as suggested in ref [5] ) or from the more mundane fact that the apparatus may be cheaply manufactured, it can certainly influence the experimental results. In any experiment, it is important to understand the accuracy of the apparatus which is actually used; the possibility of more-nearly-accurate apparatus somewhere else in the universe is not relevant.
Added note: After the original version of this paper was posted, I noticed an (earlier) paper by Bartlett, Rudolph and Spekkens (BRS) [19] , and I realized that the story of the quantum-mechanics exam can also serve as an illustration of points made in that paper. BRS argue that whether or not coherences (i. e. off-diagonal elements of ρ) vanish can depend on the way the system is described. That is what does happen with Alice and Bob; in the case I have called complete energy decoherence (which is the case in which Bob's wristwatch is no good at all) matrix elements of ρ Q,B between states of different energy vanish, while those of ρ Q,A might not. Thus Bob plays the role of the "fictionist", and Alice the role of the "factist" mentioned in the title of BRS. BRS argue further that the choice of description would not lead to different predictions for experiments. Since neither Alice nor Bob has made any mistake, they certainly would not give contradictory predictions, and in the case in which Q has a subsystem which is an accurate clock, eqs. 11 and 15 show that their predictions would be the same. In the terminology used by BRS, the clock-subsystem of Q serves as an "internal reference frame", the clock on the wall as an "implicated external reference frame", and Bob's watch, if sufficiently inaccurate, as a "nonimplicated external reference frame".
[10] Story-telling has been said to be a useful pedagogical technique for mathematics, so why not try it here? See S. Tomlin, Nature 436, 622 (2005).
[11] The grade that Bob receives on the examination may depend on the foundational views of the person doing the grading. Perhaps that person holds the view that the state Bob assigns to a quantum system should just represent the knowledge that Bob has about the system; then Bob would surely receive the grade of A, since eq. 3 does correctly represent what he knows about Q. On the other hand, perhaps the grader holds the view that the state of Q really is that given in eq. 1, and therefore that Bob, because he has not looked at the clock, is ignorant of what that state really is. According to this view, Bob's answer (eq. 3) would need the "ignorance interpretation", but this should be worth at least a grade of B.
